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THE AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY CLAUSE
DAVm COHEN t AND ALBERT B. GERBER $
At common law property to be created or acquired in the future
could not be transferred or encumbered prior to the creation or ac-
quisition of the property.1 Illustrative of the constant striving to make
future assets available for present purposes was the attempt of com-
mon-law lawyers to add to the conveyances of the day the words:
"Quae quovismodo in futurum habere potero." 2 But, as Littleton says,
these words were "void in law". The reasoning upon which the rule
was based was simple--"A man cannot grant or charge that which he
hath not." 3 This infallible bit of syllogistic logic received its first
breakdown in the famous case of Grantham v. Hawley,4 the parent of
the fictitious doctrine of "potential existence". Briefly stated, this prin-
ciple permits the sale 5 or encumbrance of future personal property 6
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I. See 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. i92o) 2368.
2. The quotation in full reads: "Also, these words, which are commonly put in such
releases, scil. (quae quovismodo it futurum habere potaro) [freely translated: What-
ever property I may have in the future] are as void in law; for no right passeth by a
release, but the right which the releasor hath at the time of the release made. For if
there be father and son, and the father be disseised, and the son (living his father)
releaseth by his deed to the disseisor all the right which he hath or may have in the same
tenements without clause of warranty, &c. and after the father dieth, &c. the son may
lawfully enter upon the possession of the disseisor, for that he had no right in the land
in his father's life, but the right descended to him after the release made by the death
of his father, &c." LrrLETON'S TENURES *§ 446. This is the "earliest treatise on the
English Law printed anywhere." WAMBOUGH, LiTTLEON'S TENUREs IN ENGLISH
(903) Lx.
3. PERINS, PROFITABLE BOOK *15.
4. Hobart i32 (K. B. i616).
5. Only under the doctrine of potential existence may one "sell" property not yet
in existence in the sense of passing "title" to such property. Realistically viewed, the
difference between the sale and the mortgaging of property not yet in existence is that in
the former the risk of loss is transferred whereas in the latter it remains in the mort-
(635)
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having a so-called potential existence arising from the fact that the
processes of creation have already begun, with the limitation that the
basic substance which yields the increment must be owned by the vendor
or mortgagor. Typical examples would be crops already planted upon
land of the vendor, or wool to be grown upon sheep owned by the mort-
gagor. As stated by the court: "A parson may grant all the tithewool
that he shall have in . . . a year; yet perhaps he shall have none; but
a man cannot grant all the wool, that shall grow upon his sheep that
he shall buy hereafter; for there he hath it neither actually nor poten-
tially." 7 The doctrine rests, of course, upon the fiction that a man
may own something that is not yet in existence but which in the normal
course of events will come into being; thereby the rule that "a man can-
not grant or charge that which he has not" is left inviolate. The re-
fusal of the court to recognize the fictional quality of its rule prevented
the satisfaction of more than a very small portion of the need for which
the rule itself had been evolved. Grantham v. Hawley left us with
little more than we had before; but it was the first step toward the
solution of a problem, vexing even today-the problem of how to utilize
future property for present credit.
The civil law had a simple device-a "mortgage on an estate to
come." 8 Therefore, it is not surprising that one of our greatest
students of the civil law, Justice Joseph Story, should have been the
first on the bench to establish the precedent in Anglo-American law that
future property may be presently charged. The case is, of course,
Mitchell v. Winslow.9  Cutlery manufacturers, in order to bolster their
business, borrowed money, and as security therefor executed a deed of
trust conveying the manufacturing plant "together with all tools and
gagor. This difference may account for the greater latitude allowed in the mortgaging
as opposed to the sale of property not yet in existence. See Williston, Transfers of
After-Acquired Personal Property (I9O6) ig H.Av. L. REV. 557, 570. Insofar as third
persons are concerned the attempt of the parties to pass "title" to the property has no
effect. Interests acquired between the date of the contract and delivery of the product
are not divested. Hamilton v. Klinke, 42 Cal. App. 426, 183 Pac. 675 (igg), i8 MIcHl.
L. REv. i65, 9 CALI. L. REv. 76 (1920), 33 HAzv. L. REv. 479; i WmnsToxo, SALEs
(2d ed. 1924) 259.
6. The term "future property" is, of course, a contradiction in itself. However, as
it is a shorthand expression referring to property not yet acquired or not yet in exist-
ence, or both, it has the utility of combining brevity with clarity.
7. Hobart r32a (K. B. 1616).
8. This provision reads: "Mortgage on an Estate to come.-Those who bind
themselves by an engagement whatsoever may, for the security of their performance of
the engagement on their part, appropriate and mortgage, not only the estate they are
masters of at the time of contracting, but likewise all the estate which they shall be
afterwards seized or possessed of. And this mortgage extends to all the things which
they shall afterwards acquire, that are capable of being mortgaged, by what title soever
it be that they acquire them, and even to those which are not in being when the obligation
is contracted;" I DOmAT, Civxi LAW (Strahan's Trans. Cushing's ed. 1850) 649. The
civil law citation is: DOMAT, Loix CivmEs (Nouvelle ed. by Hericourt, 1777) pt. I, bk.
III, tit. I, § I, art. V.
9. 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9673 (C. C. D. Me. 1843).
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machinery . . . which we may at any time purchase for four years
from this date, and also all the stock which we may manufacture or
purchase during said four years." The instrument was recorded and
upon default the mortgagee took possession of some after-acquired
tools. The mortgagor went into bankruptcy and thereupon perplexing
questions arose. Did the trust instrument create a lien upon the after-
acquired property? If it did, was such a lien good against creditors?
The bankruptcy judge certified these two questions to Circuit Judge
Story, and Story answered in the affirmative, stating that although it
was true that future property could not be presently charged at com-
mon law, nevertheless equity would enforce the agreement. He pointed
out that equity precedents existed, if authority was necessary, in the
analogous cases of contracts to assign future claims and expectancies.
His conclusion is the most frequently quoted passage in the field:
"It seems to me a clear result of all of the authorities, that wher-
ever the parties, by their contract, intended to create a positive lien
or charge, either upon real or upon personal property, whether
then owned by the assignor or contractor, or not, or if personal
property, whether it is then in esse or not, it attaches in equity as
a lien or charge upon the particular property, as soon as the as-
signor or contractor acquires a title thereto, against the latter, and
all persons asserting a claim thereto, under him, either voluntarily,
or with notice, or in bankruptcy." 10
Mitchell v. Winslow was paralleled about twenty years later by
the celebrated English case of Holroyd v. Marshall,1' decided by the
House of Lords. Here, a deed of trust covering the machinery in a
mill and containing the provision that "all machinery, implements, and
things which, during the continuance of this security, shall be . . .
placed in or about the said mill . . . shall . . . be subject to the
trusts . . .," was executed and recorded. Subsequently, a creditor
of the mortgagor levied on after-acquired property. The mortgagor
then defaulted and possession of the property was taken by the mort-
gagees in disregard of the creditor's levy. The House of Lords upheld
the claim of the mortgagees on the ground that "immediately on the
new machinery and effects being fixed or placed in the mill, they became
subject to the operation of the contract, and passed in equity to the
mortgagees .. 12
With such excellent precedents on the books it would have ap-
peared that the problem was solved and that after-acquired property
io. Id. at 533.
ii. io H. L. Cas. 191 (1862).
12. Id. at 211 (Lord Chancellor Westbury).
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could be mortgaged and that recording of the mortgaging instrument
would constitute notice to would-be purchasers and creditors. Yet,
three years after Story's excellent decision the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court held that a recorded mortgage on after-acquired prop-
erty (stock of goods) was not effective against creditors. 13 The action
was at law and left open the possibility that the result might be other-
wise in equity. But then came Moody v. Wright.14  Here, the owner
of a tanning business executed a purchase-money mortgage which in-
cluded an after-acquired property clause. The mortgage was recorded.
Subsequently, an assignee for benefit of creditors was appointed under
a state "insolvent law" and the mortgagee contested his right to the
after-acquired property. The court held that the assignee prevailed on
the ground that nothing had been done by either the mortgagor or the
mortgagee to perfect the lien attempted to be created by the after-
acquired property clause.
A cursory examination of the cases from a doctrinaire standpoint
without consideration of the varying economic factors involved would
reveal that some jurisdictions follow Story's Equity rule, others accept
the Massachusetts doctrine, a few follow both, and still others have
set up independent principles. Before analyzing the decisions from a
factual standpoint it might be well to consider for a moment the legal
conclusions resulting from the operation of several of the so-called
rules.
The Equity Rule
Under the Equity rule an after-acquired property clause creates a
lien upon the property at the time of its acquisition by the mortgagor.
If the mortgage is recorded the lien of the mortgagee will be superior
to the claim of purchasers, 15 creditors, 16 and subsequent mortgagees.'7
13. Jones v. Richardson, io Metc. 481 (Mass. 1845).
14. 13 Metc. i7 (Mass. 1847).
15. Rust v. Electric Lighting Co., 124 Ala. 202, 27 So. 263 (1899) ; Farmers Trust
& Say. Bank v. Miller, 2o3 Iowa 1380, 214 N. W. 546 (1927) ; Loupee v. Mich. Cent.
1. R., 243 Mich. 144, 219 N. W. 727 (1928) ; Woodlief v. Harris & Parham, 95 N. C. 211
(1886); Barron v. San Angelo Nat. Bank, 138 S. W. I42 (Tex. Civ. App. x9ii);
Bonneville Lumber Co. v. Peppard Seed Co., 72 Utah 463, 271 Pac. 226 (1928);
Triumph Electric Co. v. Empire Furniture Co., 7o W. Va. 164, 73 S. E. 325 (191I).
16. Martin v. Bankers' Trust Co., I8 Ariz. 55, 156 Pac. 87 (1916); Pierre v.
Pierre, 210 Iowa 1304, 232 N. W. 633 (193o) ; Smithhurst v. Edmunds, 14 N. J. Eq.
4o8 (Ch. 1862) ; Merchants & Farmers Bank v. Pearson, 186 N. C. 6og, 120 S. E. 210
(1923) ; Parker & Co. v. Jacobs, 14 S. C. 112 (188o) ; Waters v. Ellington & Co., 289
S. W. 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) ; First Nat. Bank of Alexandria v. Turnbull & Co.,
32 Gratt. 695 (Va. i88o) ; Frank v. Hicks, 4 Wyo. 502, 35 Pac. 475 (1894).
17. Meyer v. Johnston, 53 Ala. 237 (x875); Bank of Oakman v. Union Coal Co.,
I5 F. (2d) 36o (C. C. A. 5th, 1926) (following Alabama law); First Nat. Bank of
Yuma v. Yuma Nat. Bank, 30 Ariz. 188, 245 Pac. 277 (1926) ; Ludlum v. Rothchild,
41 Minn. 218, 43 N. W. 137 (I889) ; Hickson Lumber Co. v. Gay Lumber Co., I5o
N. C. 282, 63 S. E. io45 (i9o9) ; Richardson v. Washington & Costley Bros., 88 Tex.
339, 31 S. W. 614 (1895).
THE AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY CLAUSE
Liens already existing against the property will not, of course, be dis-
placed by the lien of the after-acquired property clause.'
The Massachusetts Rule
Even under the Massachusetts rule an after-acquired property
clause is valid as between the immediate parties.19 If the mortgagee
takes possession of the after-acquired property before the claims of
purchasers or lienz creditors accrue, the mortgagee's claim is superior; 20
but if an interest is acquired in the property, by lien or purchase, prior
to the taking of possession by the mortgagee, the mortgagee's claim is
inferior even though the mortgage is of record.21  Courts appear to
follow this rule throughout New England and in some other states.
22
The New York Rule
New York 23 follows the Equity rule with respect to subsequent
purchasers, holding that as to them a recorded mortgage of after-
i8. Bear Lake & River Water Works & Irrig. Co. v. Garland, 164 U. S. x (1896);
Weiss, Dreyfous & Seiferth v. Natchez Investment Co., 166 Miss. 253, 14o So. 736
(1932) ; Galloway v. Blue Springs Mining Co., 37 S. W. ioi6 (Tenn. Ch. 1896) ; Com-
munity State Bank v. Martin, 144 Wash. 483, 258 Pac. 498 (1927).
ig. See Chick v. Nute, 176 Mass. 57, 58, 57 N. E. 219 (I9oo) ; Wasserman v. Mc-
Donnell, 190 Mass. 326, 328, 76 N. E. 959, 96o (igo6).
20. In re Robert Jenkins Corp., I7 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. ist, 1927) ; Rowley v.
Rice, ii Metc. 333 (Mass. 1846) ; Chase v. Denny, 130 Mass. 566 (i88i). Accord:
Tennis v. Midkiff, 55 I1. App. 642 (1894) ; Burrill v. Whitcomb, ioo Me. 286, 61 AtI.
678 (19o5) ; Cook v. Corthell, ii R. I. 482 (1877) ; Peabody v. Landon, 61 Vt. 318, 17
AtI. 781 (1889). Under this rule even if possession is taken by the mortgagee when he
has reason to believe that the mortgagor is insolvent, no voidable preference in bank-
ruptcy exists and the mortgagee is entitled to priority. Humphrey v. Tatman, 198 U. S.
91 (19o5) ; ef. In re Robert Jenkins Corp., 17 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 1st, 1927).
21. In addition to cases already cited the following are holdings on this point:
Codman v. Freeman, 3 Cush. 3o6 (Mass. 1849) (after-acquired furniture in an inn;
attaching creditors prevail over mortgagee) ; Davis v. Smith-Springfield Body Corp.,
250 Mass. 278, 145 N. E. 434 (924) (automobile to be acquired; subsequent incum-
brancer taking possession awarded priority over prior after-acquired property mort-
gagee). Apparently, even the agreement of a subsequent incumbrancer to subordinate
himself to a prior after-acquired property clause mortgagee will be of no avail to modify
the rigor of the Massachusetts rule. Chesley v. Josselyn, 73 Mass. 489 (1856).
22. American Surety Co. v. Worchester Cycle Mfg. Co., ioo Fed. 40 (C. C. D.
Conn. i9oo) ; Gaylor v. Harding, 37 Conn. So8 (1871) ; Hunt v. Bullock, 23 Ill. 320
(186o) (future-property mortgagee held inferior to execution creditors of office furni-
ture included within the provisions of the after-acquired property clause of a railroad
mortgage) ; In re Danville Hotel Co., 33 F. (2d) 162 (E. D. Ill. 1929) ; Long v. Hines,
4o Kan. 216, 16 Pac. 339 (I888), af'd on rehearing, 4o Kan. 220, ig Pac. 796 (1888) ;
Schmidt v. Plummer, 14o Kan. 436, 37 P. (2d) I (1934) ; Griffith v. Douglass, 73 Me.
532 (1882) ; Williams v. Noyes & Nutter Mfg. Co., 112 Me. 408, 92 Atl. 482 (1914) ;
Dexter v. Citizens Nat. Bank, 4 Neb. Unoff. 380, 94 N. W. 530 (1903) (corporate
future-property mortgagee held inferior to subsequent purchaser with actual knowledge
of the after-acquired property clause) ; Spinney v. Meloon, 74 N. H. 384, 68 AtI. 41o
(1907); Maher v. Smead Heating & Ventilating Co., ii Ohio C. C. 381 (1896);
Clark v. Strickler Bros. Canning Co., ii Ohio App. 250 (1919); Williams v. Briggs,
in R. I. 476 (1877) ; Single v. Phelps, 20 Wis. 398 (1866) ; In re Allen's Estate, 65 Vt.
392, 26 Atl. 591 (1893).
23. See Stone, The "Equitable Mortgage" in New York (192o) 20 CoL. L. REv.
519; WALSH, MORTGAGES (1934) 57-63.
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acquired property is fully effective,24 yet is in accord with the Massa-
chusetts rule that the future-property mortgagee is inferior to the claims
of creditors acquiring interests in the property before possession is
taken by the mortgagee.
2 5
Miscellaneous Rules
In Kentucky the mortgagee under an after-acquired property
clause has priority over third persons only with respect to the increase
in female animals 20 and property subsequently acquired by a corpora-
tion to be used in performing functions authorized by its articles of
incorporation.2 7 Michigan follows the Equity rule 28 with the limita-
tion that the future property must be related to the business of the
mortgagor.2 9  Alabama also applies the Equity rule generally 3 0 with
the requirement that in a mortgage of crops to-be-grown the mortgagor
must have a present interest in the land upon which the crops are to be
planted,81 even though the interest be no more than a verbal lease.32  In
Georgia, as a result of the judicial interpretation of a statute,33 an
after-acquired property clause creates no lien even as between the
24. Kribbs v. Alford, 12o N. Y. 519, 24 N. E. 8ri (i8go); Duffus v. Bangs, 122
N. Y. 423, 25 N. E. 98o (i8go) ; Central Trust Co. v. West India Improvement Co., 169
N. Y. 314, 62 N. E. 387 (I9o).
25. Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N. Y. 570, 37 N. E. 632 (1894). The
effect of taking possession in New York is not clear. See Stone, Stpra note 23, at 530,
n. 51.
26. Forman v. Proctor, 9 B. Mon. 124 (Ky. 1849).
27. Moulder Holcomb Co. v. Glasgow Cooperage Co., 173 Ky. 519, 191 S. W. 275
(1917) ; see United States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Vogt Mach. Co., i82 Ky.
473, 482, 2o6 S. W. 8o6, 8o9 (ii8), where the court states that a mortgage on property
to be acquired creates no lien upon the property as against third persons ". . . except
in the instance of the increase of a female animal covered by a mortgage and where
property is acquired by a corporation, when undertaking to exercise powers which are
conferred upon it by its charter." The first half of this "exception" is obviously a relic
of the rule of potential existence. Accord: Westinghouse Electric Mfg. Co. v. Citizens
State Ry., 24 Ky. L. Rep. 334, 68 S. W. 463 (19o2) (on its facts, probably an accession
case) ; cf. Wender Blue Gem Coal Co. v. Louisville Property Co., 137 Ky. 339, 125
S. W. 732 (191o) (holding recorded after-acquired property mortgagee inferior to
creditors' claims without discussion of Kentucky corporation rule).
28. Eddy v. McCall, 71 Mich. 497, 39 N. W. 734 (1888) ; Pere Marquette R. R. v.
Graham, 136 Mich. 444, 99 N. W. 408 (1904).
29. Ferguson v. Wilson, 122 Mich. 97, 8o N. W. ioo6 (1899) ; see Fidelity Corp.
v. Post, 273 Mich. 697, 702, 263 N. W. 775, 777 (935) (" . . in this State a chattel
mortgage may be given upon property . . . after-acquired in the usual and ordinary
course of business.").
30. Meyer v. Johnston, 53 Ala. 237 (1875) ; Rust v. Electric Lighting Co., z24 Ala.
202, 27 So. 263 (1899).
31. Windham & Co. v. Stephenson & Alexander, 156 Ala. 341, 47 So. 280 (19o8);
Vinson Bros. v. Finlay, 206 Ala. 478, 90 So. 310 (1921) ; Alexander v. Garland, 209
Ala. 267, 96 So. r38 (1923); Farmers Union Warehouse Co. v. McIntosh, i Ala. App.
407, 56 So. io2 (1911). These cases overruled, sub silentio, Hurst & McWhorter v.
Bell & Co., 72 Ala. 336 (1882).
32. Littleton v. Abernathy, 195 Ala. 65, 70 So. 282 (1915).
33. GA. CODE ANN. (937) § 67-103. A similar statute exists in Louisiana, LA.
Civ. CODE (Dart, 1932) § 3308, and Porto Rico, PORTO Rico REv. STAT. (1913) tit. 108,
no. 5, p. io8o.
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parties,8 4 except with respect to a deed of trust to secure an issue of
bonds and other minor exceptions expressly authorized by statute.35
The Result
The result has been a multitude of conflicting and confusing cases.
For example, in Arkansas a well-reasoned decision,36 based upon the
Equity rule, held that a mortgagee under an after-acquired property
clause was entitled to priority over a purchaser of subsequently-acquired
lumber. Later, the court in a correctly-decided opinion ruled that an
after-acquired property clause was of no effect as against attaching
creditors of a stock of merchandise; 37 but the reason announced by the
court was that the "trend of our decisions is in accord with the holding
of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts." 38 In Maryland there is a
line of old cases which accepts the Equity rule that an after-acquired
property clause is effective against third persons; 3 but a dictum in a
more recent case states that an after-acquired property clause "has no
validity and no effect, except as it may have a bearing upon the intent"
of the parties with respect to accession.40  In Missouri there is a series
of cases which recognizes the validity of an after-acquired property
clause as against a subsequent mortgagee of land,4 1 of furniture, 42 and
as against other claimants of miscellaneous property.43 At the same
time, we find some cases which hold, and other cases which contain dicta
to the effect that an after-acquired property clause mortgagee, even
though the mortgage is recorded, is subordinate to the claims of execu-
34. Durant v. D'Auxy, 1O7 Ga. 456, 33 S. E. 478 (1899) ; Penton v. Hall, 14o Ga. 235,
79 S. E. 465 (1913) ; Peoples Credit Clothing Co. v. Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co., 54
Ga. App. 832, 188 S. E. 913 (1936) (unconditional ownership insurance policy held not
invalidated by a future-property mortgage because latter had no effect). Accord:
Dunson & Bros. Co. v. Unity Cotton Mills, 34 Ga. App. 768, 131 S. E. 186 (1926).
35. The statute expressly permits the inclusion of after-acquired property in deeds
of trust executed to secure issues of bonds, and mortgages of fluctuating stocks of goods.
GA. CODE ANx. (937) § 67-103. If there is statutory authority for the mortgaging of
subsequently acquired property, the Georgia courts will hold such a mortgage valid,
upon recording as against third persons. Peeples v. Trust Co., 256 Fed. 627 (C. C. A.
5th, 1919); Southern Ry. v. Lancaster, 149 Ga. 434, IOO S. E. 380 (1919).
36. Morton v. Williamson, 72 Ark. 390, 81 S. W. 235 (1904). See discussion of
stock of goods cases, infra p. 656.
37. Farrow v. Farrow, 136 Ark. 140, 2o6 S. W. 134 (1918).
38. Id. at 148, 206 S. W. at 137.
39. Butler v. Rahm, 46 Md. 541 (1877) (valid against third persons with knowl-
edge) ; Brady v. Johnson, 75 Md. 445, 26 At. 49 (1892) (valid, when recorded, against
attaching creditors) ; see Diggs v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 112 Md. 50, 72, 75 Atl. 517,
521 (191o).
4o. See Solter v. Macmillan, 147 Md. 58o, 587, 128 Atl. 356, 358 (1925). In 1935
a statute was passed in Maryland permitting the mortgaging of future personalty under
certain conditions. MD. CODE ANN. (Flack, Supp. 1935) art. 21, § 54A et seq.
41. Omaha & St. Louis Ry. v. Wabash, St. Louis & P. Ry., 1o8 Mo. 298, I8 S. W.
1101 (1892).
42. Wright v. Bircher's Ex'r, 72 Mo. 179 (188o).
43. Page & Bacon v. Gardner, 20 Mo. 507 (I855) ; see Smith-Wallace Shoe Co. v.
Wilson, 63 Mo. App. 326, 331 (I895).
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tion creditors and subsequent purchasers. 44  In Nebraska one set of
cases adjudges the after-acquired property clause completely invalid
even as between the parties,45 and this is followed, chronologically, by
a line of cases purporting to follow the early cases but which state that
an after-acquired property clause does create a lien as between the
parties.
46
Inconsistencies such as these, and many others not noted, can be
explained in only one of two ways. Either the courts have floundered
about so completely that their theories and rules have become unin-
telligible even to themselves, or they have sensed as they have proceeded
from one case to another that a fair result reached upon one set of facts,
and which was rationalized by resort to some theory of after-acquired
property law, would be an undesirable result to reach where a different
set of facts are presented, although the earlier rationalization is equally
applicable and would compel the inequitable result. Only by a study of
(i) the theories applied by the courts, and (2) the facts to which these
theories were appended, can we determine which is the proper explana-
tion. However, before such a study is presented, it probably would
be wise to clear the air by disposing of those theories that have no bear-
ing at all upon our problem but which have recurred sufficiently often
in statements of judges and textwriters to have added to the otherwise
almost complete confusion of thought.
The Doctrine of Estoppel
Some courts have, from time to time, utilized the doctrine of
estoppel by deed to sustain the validity of a mortgage of future prop-
erty.4 7  Analysis demonstrates that this theory is inapplicable to the
instant problem.48  The essential basis of an estoppel is that there has
been a misrepresentation, relied upon by the plaintiff to his detriment.
In an equitable estoppel in pais the misrepresentation is made orally, in
writing, or by means of conduct. In an estoppel by deed, the misrepre-
sentation is contained in a sealed instrument. The reason for the rule
44. France v. Thomas, 86 Mo. 8o (1885) ; Steckel v. Swift & Co., 56 S. W. (2d)
8o6 (Mo. App. 1933); see New England Nat. Bank v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 17I
Mo. 307, 71 S. W. 191 (1902) (possibly based on Kansas law, but see id. at 329, 330,
71 S. W. at 197).
45. Thostesen v. Doxsee, 78 Neb. 40, 11o N. W. 567 (1907) ; State Bank of Gering
v. Grover, io Neb. 42I, 193 N. W. 765 (1923), 23 COL. L. Rav. 68o; see Ginsberg,
Mortgages of After Acquired Persovalty in Nebraska (1933) II NB. L. BULL. 289,
299-300.
46. Haver v. North American Hotel Co., iii Neb. 13, 195 N. W. 483 (1923)
(possibly limited to accession) ; Kelly v. Kannarr, 118 Neb. 472, 225 N. W. 23o (1929);
First Nat. Bank of Decatur v. Young, 124 Neb. 598, 247 N. W. 586 (1933).
47. Galveston R. R. v. Cowdrey, ii Wall. 459 (U. S. 187o); Dillon v. Barnard,
Fed. Cas. No. 3,915 (C. C. D. Mass. 1874), aff'd, 21 Wall. 430 (U. S. 1874) ; Susque-
hanna Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. United Telephone and Telegraph Co., 6 F. (2d)
179 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925).
48. See Blair, The Allocation of After-Acquired Mortgaged Property Among
Rival Claimants (1926) 4o HARv. L. Ray. 222, 227-8.
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is the same in either instance, for the estoppel "concludes the truth in
order to prevent fraud . . . and imposes silence on a party only when
in conscience and honesty he should not be allowed to speak"; 4 9 it
"debars the truth . . . only in the case where its utterance would con-
vict the party of a previous falsehood." 50 It is self-evident that when
a person grants a mortgage of property to be acquired in the future
he has told no falsehood and has made no misrepresentation. Both
parties know the true state of affairs. 51
In addition, estoppel by deed is a doctrine founded upon the in-
tention of the parties.52 As a condition precedent to the application
of an estoppel it must be shown that the parties intended that the fact
in question should not be contradicted. Such a condition is never pres-
ent in a problem involving the validity of an after-acquired property
clause.
Finally, the omission of discussion of estoppel in the great bulk of
cases constitutes tacit authority that the doctrine has no place in the
law relating to after-acquired property clauses. A leading authority
on estoppel has concluded that these cases "are not treated as belonging
to the law of title by estoppel." 53
The passage of statutes in a number of states embodying the doc-
trine of estoppel by deed as applied to mortgages may cause additional
confusion in the future unless the theory upon which such statutes are
based is understood. A typical statute reads: "Title acquired by the
mortgagor subsequent to the execution of the mortgage inures to the
mortgagee as security for the debt in like manner as if acquired before
the execution." 54 If regard is had only to the words of the statute,
authority is present to support the validity of after-acquired property
clauses. However, the history of the legislation does not warrant such
smug dependence. At common law an estoppel by deed could not oper-
ate unless there were covenants or warranties expressed as to the title
of the grantor.55 The legislators, in order to enlarge the application
49. Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, ii How. 297, 326 (U. S. 1850).
50. Ibid. See also, 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (1920) 2118.
51. Roller, Estoppel as Affecting Title to Real Property (1923) 7 MARg. L. REv.
81, 94: "Where the true state of the title is known to both of the parties, or both have
same means of acquiring knowledge as to the true state of the title, there cannot be an
estoppel."
52. McCullough v. Dashiell, 78 Va. 634 (1884) ; see 3 DEvLIN, REAL PROPERTY AND
DEEDS (3d ed. 1911) 2433.
53. BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL (6th ed. 1913) 483, n. 6; see also (1936) 14 TaixN. L. REV.
II8, 120.
54. See, e. g., CALIF. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 2930; IDAHO CODE AN. (1932)
§ 44-807.
55. Allen v. Sayward, 5 Me. 227 (1828); Doane v. Willcutt, 5 Gray 328 (Mass.
1855). Another limitation at common law was that title by estoppel could be acquired
only if the original "conveyance" had been by means of a feoffment, fine, or common
recovery. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (1920) § 545. Possibly a "lease" was included.
See BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL (6th ed. 1913) 419. However, the limitation on the type of
conveyance never was accepted in this country. See 2 TIFANY, 10C. cit. supra.
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of the doctrine of title by estoppel to include mortgages not containing
express covenants or warranties of title where all other facts necessary
to constitute an estoppel are present, enacted these statutes.56
Furthermore, it has been held that the statute will not be applied if
the grantee has knowledge that the grantor did not have title at the
time of the conveyance. 57  No such limitation can be found in the stat-
utes; it is a limitation present only in the common law theory of estoppel
by deed.
Accession to Mortgaged Property
Another doctrine that must be eliminated in order clearly to under-
stand the future-property mortgage cases is that of accession, occa-
sionally termed the doctrine of "fixtures".5" The doctrine of fixtures
properly belongs in that field of property law involving the conversion
of personal property to real estate through annexation to the freehold,
as for example, where the problem is one involving the type of prop-
erty that can be the subject of larceny, or that can be replevied, etc.
The doctrine is so different in substance when applied to mortgages
that, to avoid confusion, it should have a distinguishing appellation.
The following discussion will, it is expected, make this apparent.
At common law, physical annexation to the land was necessary. 59
However, when the doctrine was carried over into the field of mort-
gages it was broadened to include any property integrated by use with
the mortgaged property. Thus, Chief Justice Gibson in a well-known
passage stated:
". .. the simple criterion of physical attachment is so limited in
its range, and so productive of contradiction [that it will not be
accepted] ... The courts will be drawn . . . by . . . liber-
56. This view is supported by Kline v. Ragland, 47 Ark. III, 14 S. W. 474 (1886),
and see particularly the language of the court at p. 117. A similar view is adopted in
17 CALIF. JuaRs. 857 (1924).
57. Viele v. Van Steenberg, 31 Fed. 249 (C. C. N. D. Iowa, 1887). In this case,
a county deeded land in 1861 to A. However, at this time the deed was ineffective
because of a statute which provided that counties could not deed such lands unless there
was clear title in the state. Later in the same year A purported to convey the same
land to B. In 1874 the State of Iowa acquired title to the land. Thereafter, the county
conveyed the same land to A. In 1875 A conveyed to X and thereafter there were
several conveyances from X to Y and Y to the present complainant. The controversy
is as to whether B has title predicated upon estoppel by deed as a result of the A-B
deed of 1861. A statute in the state reads: "When a deed purports to convey a greater
interest than the grantor was at that time possessed of, any after-acquired interest of
such grantor, to the extent of that which the deed purports to convey, inures to the ben-
efit of the grantee." The court held that since B knew that A did not have title in the
land at the time of the A-B deed, there was no estoppel despite the fact that the statute
made no mention of the element of knowledge. An additional ground for the decision
was that B had not demonstrated payment for the land and therefore would not receive
help from an equity court.
58. McCLELLAND AND FISHER, LAW OF CORPORATE MORTGAGE BOND ISSUES (1937)
256.
59. Anon. Case, Y. B. 21 Hen. VII, f. 26, pl. 4 (i5o6).
THE AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY CLAUSE
- ality and fitness . . . away from the old criterion [because of]
. its narrowness and want of adaptation to the business and
improvements of the age." 60
The doctrine now established in most jurisdictions is that any per-
sonal property, so connected by use with an estate subject to mortgage
that it becomes an integral part thereof, also becomes subject to the
mortgage, whether the mortgage contains an after-acquired property
clause or not.61 Unfortunately, the courts have not always realized this
and often when a case arises presenting a factual situation fitting
squarely within the rule of accession, will, if an after-acquired prop-
erty clause is present, base their decision upon the after-acquired
property clause with the additional statement that the new property
has now become "an integral part" of the mortgaged estate.62  The
lawyer is then left in doubt as to whether (i) an after-acquired prop-
erty clause is valid in the jurisdiction, or (2) the case is a precedent
with respect to accession to mortgaged realty, or (3) both accession
and an after-acquired property clause are necessary to create a lien.
It might be noted in passing that if the courts were consistent in
applying the principle of accession there would be little need for the
after-acquired property clause in many instances. However, the case
law indicates that the field has become so confused as to render neces-
sary a more practicable technique for the creation of security. As Pro-
fessor Bingham has so aptly stated:
"There are some parts of our law that have been particularly
favored dumping grounds for loose, inaccurate legal phraseology,
careless definition of legal issues, artificial generalizations, and
other such d6bris which in the course of the years have obscured
the real criteria of judicial decisions and have unnecessarily ren-
dered the law difficult of apprehension. The law of 'fixtures' has
been one of these dumping grounds." 63
6o. Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 W. & S. 116, 118 (Pa. 1841).
61. It re East Stroudsburg Glass Co., 247 Fed. 614 (M. D. Pa. 1917) (attached
hand glass molds used in glass manufactory, held integral part of mortgaged plant) ;
Morgan Utilities v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 183 Ark. 492, 37 S. W. (2d) 9o (1931)
(oil-burning engine severed from base held to remain a "fixture" and part of mortgaged
estate) ; Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Harkins, 312 Pa. 402, 167 Atl. 278 (1933) (re-
movable machinery, patterns and dies held subject to industrial plant mortgage) ; cf.
Wurlitzer Co. v. Cohen, 156 Md. 368, 144 Atl. 641 (1929) (organ placed in theatre held
not a "fixture" so as to become subject to lessor's security lease).
62. General Parts Corp. v. First Trust & Say. Bank, 87 Ind. App. 5oi, 161 N. E.
695 (1928); see, e. g., Roebling's Sons Co. v. Nebraska Electric Co., io6 Neb. 255,
183 N. W. 546 (I92I); Mackall-Paine Veneer Co. v. Vancouver Plywood Co., 177
Wash. 503, 32 P. (2d) 530 (1934) ; cf. judge Cardozo in Guaranty Trust Co. v. New
York & Queens County Ry., 253 N. Y. 19o, 2o6, 17o N. E. 887, 893 (193o), "Accession
as a source of title is quite distinct from the operation of a covenant for after-acquired
property."
63. Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning the Law of Fixtures (1907) 7 COL. L.
REv. I; see also, generally, Friedman, The Scope of Mortgage Liens on Fixtures and
Personal Property in New York (1938) 7 FORDHAm L. REV. 331.
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An excellent illustration of this remark is found in a Minnesota
case where steam radiators screwed to the steam pipes were held, as a
matter of law, to have become part of the mortgaged property, while
gas fixtures screwed to the gas pipes remained personalty; however, the
status of cigar counters was in doubt, so that problem had to be left
to the jury! 64 An equally amusing situation exists in Massachusetts.
In one case the court held that a refrigeration system had not become so
identified with the realty as to become a part thereof and thus subject
to a real estate mortgage. 5 A few months later the court held other-
wise. 6  The distinction of the court is based upon inferences drawn
by the trial judge as to the intention of the parties! 67
With such precedents existing, the draftsman of a mortgage can
hardly rely upon the principle of accession to operate to create sufficient
security. An after-acquired property clause must be used whenever
it is desired that property subsequently to be acquired should be subject
to the lien of the mortgage.
Having discussed the doctrines that cannot be utilized to sustain
the validity of an after-acquired property clause, we now turn to the
modern theory which is somewhat more acceptable.
The Modern Theory
The prevalent reasoning of the courts in according validity to a
present mortgage of property subsequently to be acquired is that an
obligation is created which is specifically enforceable in equity. 68 Pro-
tection of the mortgagee against the claims of third persons is found
in the equity rule that only bona fide purchasers for value cut off a
mortgagee's equity.
This theory assumes that the mortgagor agrees by the insertion of
the after-acquired property clause to execute additional conveyances
every time he acquires new property. Since this is contrary to the inten-
tion of the parties, the theory is reinforced by an equitable maxim-
equity regards that which ought to be done as done. 9 The combina-
tion creates a logical sequence pleasant to legalistic minds. The mort-
gagor, upon acquisition of property, is under a duty to transfer the
property to the mortgagee. The law will enforce the obligation if the
mortgagor is recalcitrant. Since equity will enforce the duty, equity
will continually view the situation with its wishful lorgnette and regard
64. Capehart v. Foster, 6i Minn. 132, 63 N. W. 257 (1895).
65. Stiebel v. Beaudette & Graham Co., 275 Mass. io8, T75 N. E. 267 (ig3i).
66. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Commonwealth Mtge. & Loan Co., 276 Mass. 335,
I77 N. E. 88 (1931).
67. See Note (I935) i5 B. U. L. REV. 410, 419-20.
68. See Pennock v. Coe, 23 How. 117, 129 (U. S. 1859) ; WILLISTON, supra note 5,
at 56o et seq.
69. See In re Lind [g5] 2 Ch. 345, 36o; 2 MACHEN, MODERN LAW OF CORPORA-
TIONs (1908) 1507; Blair, supra note 48, at 226.
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the duty as having been performed; therefore, equity will subject newly-
acquired property to the lien of the mortgage.
The Conflict of Interests
The modern theory employed by the courts may not rest upon too
firm a foundation,70 but it can do no harm so long as it is understood
that it merely provides a doctrinaire rationale for arriving at desirable
results. The basic difficulty is that it proves too much. To apply it
with inflexible rigidity to every situation would result in the absence
of any restrictions upon the power of a man or a corporation to subject
to charge all and any property that he or it may ever acquire. There
are three major social interests that must be counter-balanced in evalu-
ating the wisdom of such an unlimited rule. The first two concern the
mortgagor; the last involves the third parties concerned.
i. It is undoubtedly true that "permitting parties to realize on
future prospects by present . . . encumbrances of their chances or ex-
pectations, for a present price paid, would make available a consider-
able additional range of intangible assets for present use in supporting
productive activities for the more complete satisfaction of human
wants." 71
2. However, "if such a framework can extend indefinitely into the
future, the possibility would be open of a man's alienating for present
advances not to be sure his entire personal freedom, but still the entire
produce of his labor for an indefinite period in the only line in which
he knows how to make a living-a somewhat refined sort of peon-
age." 72
3. Interrelated is the constant problem of notice to creditors and
purchasers that the property is subject to a lien in order that there be
no reliance upon a false appearance of prosperity.
Here, then, we have a sharp conflict of interests, and a feasible
limitation upon the scope of the after-acquired property clause must be
found so that a proper balance will be achieved. The courts, through
their judicial subconscious perception of the economic problems in-
volved, have, from time to time, laid down rules directed toward a
solution of the conflict. The tendency has been, when holding an after-
acquired property clause valid, to utilize every available fact without
regard to its relevancy to the issue before the court. By stating too
many grounds for a given decision, the court has often made it seem
that it is only by the presence of that particular combination of facts
7o. WiLiSTON, rupra note 5, at 56I; see also ASHBtRNE, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY
(Browne ed. I933) 245-247 (advocating the theory that the mortgagor holds the prop-
erty in trust for the mortgagee).
71. VOLD, SALES (93) 101-102.
72. LLEwELYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TEE LAW OF SALES (1930) 577.
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that validity is achieved. On the other hand, where the facts before
the court have properly called for an adjudiction of invalidity, the lan-
guage of the opinion has tended to be unlimited in scope, debarring,
for all time, it would seem, any effective use of the after-acquired prop-
erty clause. As a result, the rules announced, in the main, have been
too narrow or too broad, successfully solving the immediate issue before
the court, but leaving for the future an uncertainty that has no basis
for existence.
Differentiation between Public Service Corporations and Private
Corporations
The first limitation to appear was that while a public service cor-
poration may mortgage effectively its after-acquired property, a private
corporation may not.73  Although criticized as "illogical" 7- and "un-
fortunate",7 5 a true evaluation of the rule can only be made by refer-
ence to its historical basis.
Courts were, from the first, reluctant to permit the present charg-
ing of future property, but "were early driven, by commercial neces-
sity, to hold that a mortgage of a railroad, covering rolling stock,
machinery, etc., was operative upon after-acquired property." '6 Then,
as other cases arose involving canal companies, power companies, and
the like, the courts realized that railroads comprised too small a unit
to be accorded preferential treatment, and the rule was enlarged to
include public service corporations generally. 77 Subsequently, as is cus-
tomary, rationalization set in, and the rule was justified on the ground
that it was important in the public interest that enterprises serving the
public be kept intact and not dismembered by the separation of the
after-acquired property from the original property.78 With respect to
this observation it should be noted (I) that it is rationalization after
the fact, and (2) that while it is undoubtedly true, it is at best only
an additional reason for upholding after-acquired property clauses in
public service corporation mortgages, and is no reason for shackling the
powers of a private corporation. Furthermore, since the line between
public service corporations and private corporations is often a very hazy
73. See 4 COOK, COR'ORATIos (7th ed. 1913) 3238: "The rule that a mortgage may
cover after-acquired property applies only to a quasi-public corporation." A similar
view is taken by Hamilton, Future Property Clauses in Corporate Mortgages (1930)
4 T ap. L. Q. 131. Today such a view is clearly erroneous except in a few isolated
jurisdictions. See infra note 80.
74. McCLELLAND AND FisHER, op. cit. supra note 58, at 318.
75. MACHEN, op. cit. supra note 69, § 1857.
76. MACHEN, op. cit. supra note 68, at 1502. See McTighe v. Macon Const. Co., 94
Ga. 306, 320, 21 S. E. 701, 706 (1894).
77. See In re Adamant Plaster Co., 137 Fed. 251, 255 (N. D. N. Y. 1905).
78. See e. g., Mallory v. Maryland Glass Co., 131 Fed. IIi, 113 (C. C. D. Md.
19o4). The reasoning of the court was accepted in 4 COOK, CORPORATIONS, 10c. cit.
supra note 73.
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and indistinct one, it seems not the wisest policy to use that criterion
in a matter so fundamental and vital.
Finally, this distinction fails to consider the interests to be served
by the after-acquired property clause and the reasons justifying a limi-
tation of its scope. The argument concerning public service looks only
to the termination of an enterprise and execution upon its property by
its creditors. It ignores the fact that the after-acquired property clause
is designed to promote productive enterprise by providing security for
credit expansion. Limitations are necessary in order to prevent a cor-
poration from straitjacketing its credit.79  The restriction here imposed
will do this, but it will also do much more; it will render useless the
after-acquired property clause as a means of securing present funds on
the basis of future assets in the vast field of private enterprise. Present
authority is clearly opposed to the acceptance of the rule that effective
after-acquired property clauses may be created only by public service
corporations.8 0
79. See Note (I935) 48 HARV. L. REV. 474, 475. The problem of how far a cor-
poration shall be permitted to bind its after-acquired property presents its own peculiar
conflict of interests. With the prevalence of after-acquired property clauses in corporate
mortgages, a corporation seeking to expand is today extremely handicapped in its
efforts to offer the necessary security for loans it must make. However, the subject is
not only worthy of separate treatment but the space required for an adequate discussion
of its many perplexities makes such procedure essential. The writers, with regret,
therefore, leave the subject untouched for the present.
So. In re Medina Quarry Co., i79 Fed. 929 (W. D. N. Y. i9io) (quarry corpora-
tion) ; Equitable Trust Co. v. United States Oil & Refining Co., 35 F. (2d) so8 (D.
Wyo. i928) (oil producing corporation), rev'd on other grounds sub. norn., Werner,
Harris & Buck v. Equitable Trust Co., 35 F. (2d) 513 (C. C. A. ioth, 1929) ; Mason
v. Citizens' Nat. Trust & Say. Bank, 71 F. (:d) 246 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934), 23 CALn. L.
Ray. 628 (1935) (manufacturing corporation) ; Indian Creek Coal Min. Co. v. Home
Say. & Merchants' Bank, go Colo. 96, 249 Pac. 499 (i926) (mining company); Cum-
mings v. Consolidated Mineral Water Co., 27 R. I. i95, 6i Ati. 353 (905) (mineral
water corporation) ; McClung, Buffat & Buckwell v. Quincy Carriage & Wagon Co.,
117 Tenn. 250, 96 S. W. 96o (i9o6) (carriage building corporation) ; First Nat. Bank
of Alexandria v. Turnbull & Co., 73 Va. 695 (880) (cotton manufacturing company) ;
Triumph Electric Co. v. Empire Furniture Co., 70 W. Va. 164, 73 S. E. 325 (1911)
(furniture company) ; Benson v. Wood Motor Parts Corp., 115 W. Va. 200, 174 S. E.
895 (1934) (motor parts corporation); Frank v. Hicks, 4 Wyo. 502, 35 Pac. 475
(1894) (livestock corporation). It should be remembered that the very cases that
established the equitable rule permitting mortgages of after-acquired personalty were
cases involving an unincorporated cutlery manufactory (Mitchell case) and an unin-
corporated damask manufactory (Holroyd case).
The distinction between public service corporations and private corporations has
been preserved in Ohio by statute. Code of Ohio (Throckmorton's Baldwin, 1934)
§ 8623-75. But even in the absence of a specific statute so permitting, a railroad may
create a future-property mortgage. Coe v. Peacock, 14 Ohio St. 187 (1863) ; Coopers
& Clark v. Wolf, i5 Ohio St. 523 (1864). For a discussion of Ohio law, see 27 OHIo
JURIs. 267 (1933). Pennsylvania cases tend to follow this rule. Philadelphia, W. &
B. R. R. v. Woelpper, 64 Pa. 366 (i87o) (bondholder under railroad mortgage contain-
ing an after-acquired property clause enjoined execution upon subsequently acquired
cars and locomotives; language of opinions indicates that power is confined to rail-
roads) ; see also, Covey v. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & Chi. R. R., 3 Phila. 173 (C. P. I858) ;
cf. cases cited infra note 117, and Baker's Ex'rs v. Consumers' Box Board & Paper Co.,
21 Pa. Dist. 113 (1911).
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Differentiation between Corporations and Individuals
Permitting a corporation to mortgage future property but denying
the power to unincorporated entrepreneurs approaches closer to a solu-
tion of the problem. But inherent within such a rule is the vice that
it denies the benefit of an important economic measure in many in-
stances where social desirability requires the opposite result. For
example, an impecunious farmer 81 desires to rent a farm. The owner
of the farm in question is willing to rent it but, naturally enough, wants
security for the payment of the rent. There being no other available
security, the crops to be raised in the current year would appear to be
the logical solution to the problem. Or a chemist wants to set up a
small manufacturing plant experimentally to produce a new commodity
he has developed. A banker is willing to extend credit if security can
be furnished. The plant to be erected is obviously the best security. It
should be remembered that incorporation is not always possible, feasible,
or inexpensive. The courts have generally refused to accept this limi-
tation.
8 2
"In Prasesenti"
A limitation that runs vaguely through some decisions,8 3 and al-
though unsupported by texts has been accepted by one law review
writer, is that "after-acquired property may not be mortgaged in gross,
but only as an appurtenance to property in esse and owned by the mort-
gagor at the date of the mortgage." 84 This thought is probably a
relic of the common-law limitation of Grantham v. Hawley lingering
8r. Example taken from Ginsberg, Mortgages of After-Acquired Personalty in
Nebraska (1933) II NEB. L. Bur.L. 289, 290.
82. Mortgages by individuals held valid as against third persons: In re Dagwell,
263 Fed. 4o6 (E. D. Mich. 192o) (stock of merchandise) ; Louden v. Vinton, xo8 Mich.
313, 66 N. W. 222 (1896) (stock of hardware); Ludlum v. Rothchild, 41 Minn. 218,
43 N. W. 137 (889) (furniture) ; Stoll v. Sibson, 65 N. J. Eq. 552, 56 AtI. 71o (Ch.
19o3) (drug merchandise) ; Collerd v. Tully, 77 N. J. Eq. 439, 77 At. 1o79 (Ch. i9io)
(horses and wagons), aff'd, 78 N. J. Eq. 557, 80 Atl. 491 (1911) ; Parker & Co. v.
Jacobs, 14 S. C. 112 (188o) (turpentine) ; Iverson v. Soo Elevator Co., 22 S. D. 638,
1ig N. W. ioo6 (igo9) (crops) ; Richardson v. Washington & Costley Bros., 88 Tex.
339, 31 S. W. 614 (1895) (crops); Homer-Gaylord Co. v. Fawcett, 5o W. Va. 487, 40
S. E. 564 (igoi) (books in bookstore).
In two jurisdictions a corporation may mortgage property to be acquired while an
individual may not. In Louisiana a statute provides that "Future property can never
be the subject of conventional mortgage." LA. CiV. CODE (Dart, 1932) § 3308. A con-
ventional mortgage is a contractual mortgage, id. at § 329o, as opposed to a legal mort-
gage, i. e., a lien arising by operation of law, id. at § 3311. The latter occasionally is
termed a "tacit" mortgage. Section 33o8 has been interpreted to apply only to indi-
viduals and to offer no restrictions to corporations. Bell v. Chicago, St. L. & N. 0. R.
R., 34 La. Ann. 785 (1882). Cf. Daggett, The Chattel Mortgage in Louisiana (1938)
16 TEX. L. Ray. 162. By statute, utility corporations may now mortgage future prop-
erty. See, e. g., LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart, 1932) § i6o (electric light and power
companies). The same rule prevails in Kentucky. Compare Patterson v. Louisville
Trust Co., 17 Ky. L. Rep. 234, 30 S. W. 872 (1895) with Moulder Holcomb Co. v.
Glasgow Cooperage Co., 173 Ky. 519, 191 S. W. 275 (I917), and see stpra note 27.
83. It first appeared in a dictum in Morrill v. Noyes, 56 Me. 458, 467, 468 (1863);
see Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Sturtevant Co., 86 Miss. 509, 522, 38 So. 783, 785 (1905).
84. Blair, supra note 48, at 228; also found in 17 CALIF. Juis. 863 (1924).
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to torture present-day lawyers and a confusion of the principle of acces-
sion with principles of after-acquired property clause law. There are
cases which definitely line up against such a limitation and most courts
faced with it have rejected it in unmistakable terms.85 As phrased in
the above quotation the restriction would probably limit the operation
of the after-acquired property clause to factual situations calling for
the application of the rule of accession to mortgaged realty. Certainly
the after-acquired property clause is broader than that, and any view
which demands that some property be subjected to mortgage before
future property may be charged imposes a wholly artificial limitation.
Not only would this rule hinder the operation of the future-prop-
.erty mortgage device in many instances where social desirability calls
for its use, but it would not be enough of a brake where limitation is
both desirable and necessary. Under this principle, a farmer could
mortgage the crops to be grown on his land for the next succeeding
twenty years; but the chemist could not presently mortgage the plant
to be built with the borrowed funds, for this would be a mortgage "in
gross". The overwhelming probability is that the courts will not accept
this limitation.
Descriptive Requirements
Occasionally there has been suggested the rule that an after-
acquired property clause must specifically describe the property intended
to be charged. Unfortunately, the elementary unanalytical texts have
gone whole-hog in swallowing this limitation."0 Only one rarely cited
case has actually applied the rule to hold an after-acquired property
clause invalid.87 Contrary to this case there are a host of holdings that
a broad after-acquired property clause, i. e., "all the property now
owned or hereafter acquired by the mortgagor", will subject future
property to the lien of the mortgage at the time of acquisition by the
mortgagor. In a Pennsylvania case 88 a trust indenture created by its
terms a lien upon "all . . . property . . . either now owned, pos-
85. Galveston R. R. v. Cowdrey, II Wall. 459, 481 (U. S. 187o) : "Had there been
but one deed of trust, and had that been given before a shovel had been put into the
ground towards constructing the railroad, yet if it assumed to convey and mortgage the
railroad, which the company was authorized by law to build, together with its super-
structure, appurtenances, fixtures, and rolling stock, these several items of property, as
they came into existence, would become instantly attached to and covered by the
deed. . . ." Accord: Meyer v. Johnston, 53 Ala. 237 (1875) (see particularly page
324) ; Hogan v. Atlantic Elevator Co., 66 Minn. 344, 69 N. W. I (i896) (mortgage of
crops to be grown at a time when grantor had no interest in any property at all held
valid against subsequent specific mortgagee); Richardson v. Washington & Costley
Bros., 88 Tex. 339, 31 S. W. 614 (i895) (same).
86. 41 C. J. 302, 400-401 (1926) ; I JoNEs, LIENs (3d ed. 1914) § 33. Others have,
parrot-fashion, repeated this doctrine: I JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) 265; GINS-
BERG AND GINSBERG, MORTGAGES AND OTHER LIENS IN MARYLAND (1936) 3i.
87. Calhoun v. Memphis & P. R. R., Fed. Cas. No. 2,309 (W. D. Tenn. 1879).
88. Colonial Trust Co. v. Harmon Creek Coal Co., 287 Pa. 284, 135 Atl. 134
(1926).
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sessed or acquired" by the grantor-mortgagor. A bill in equity was
filed to include within the lien of the indenture land acquired by the
mortgagor. The action was contested on the ground that the land was
distant from the original property mortgaged and not directly related
to it. The court gave short shrift to this argument, stating that there
is not ". . . the slightest limitation as to the location of land to be
acquired . . . Nor is there the slightest intimation of such a limi-
tation . . . it is said that all after-acquired property is to be subject
to the lien of the mortgage, and we can only repeat that 'all' means
all." 81 In another leading case 90 a mortgage was created on "all the
property . . .now owned by the Gay Lumber Co. or [which] shall be
owned during the continuance of the debt hereinafter mentioned." The
mortgage was recorded and thereafter the mortgagor acquired some
land. Subsequently, the mortgagor company executed a specific mort-
gage of the newly-acquired property. In a controversy concerning the
priority between the specific mortgagee and the prior mortgagee claim-
ing under the after-acquired property clause, the court upheld the latter.
The holding is particularly strong because, although the specific mort-
gagee offered to produce evidence that he had advanced the funds used
to purchase the property in question, the court affirmed the trial court's
exclusion of the evidence, ruling, as a matter of law, that the after-
acquired property clause mortgagee had priority. Other cases are sub-
stantially in accord with these decisions. 91 In view of the imposing
array of authorities it is a reasonable conclusion that the requirement,
as stated by the texts, will not be accepted.
In a more modified form there is something in the limitation.
However, the restriction should be stated as a matter of intention. If,
from the entire mortgage instrument, it is apparent that the parties did
not intend the property in question to become a part of the mortgaged
estate, the courts will observe the intention of the parties.9 2  Insofar
89. Id. at 288, 135 Atl. at 136. (Italics by the court.)
go. Hickson Lumber Co. v. Gay Lumber Co., 15o N. C. 282, 63 S. E. 1045 (9o9).
gi. Parker v. New Orleans B. & R. & V. R. R., 33 Fed. 693 (C. C. W. D. La.
1888) ; Martin v. Bankers' Trust Co., 18 Ariz. 55, 156 Pac. 87 (1916) ; Davis v. Home,
54 Fla. 563, 45 So. 476 (19o7) ; Hughes v. Wheeler, 66 Iowa 641, 24 N. W. 251 (1885) ;
Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Peteler Car Co., 132 Minn. 277, 156 N. W. 255 (1916) ;
Omaha & St. L. Ry. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry., 1O8 Mo. 298, 18 S. W. 1101 (1892);
Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Dolgeville Electric Light & Power Co., 35 Misc. 467, 71
N. Y. Supp. 1055 (Sup. Ct. i9oi); Medford v. Myrick, 147 S. W. 876 (Tex. Civ. App.
1912) ; Frank v. Hicks, 4 Wyo. 502, 35 Pac. 475 (1894).
92. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Standard Beet Sugar Co., 15o Fed. 677 (C. C. N. D.
Neb. 19o7) (mortgage including any after-acquired "plant", held not intended to cover
a tract of land subsequently acquired 200 miles from the factory for the purpose of
raising beets for use in manufacturing sugar) ; Kastner v. Fashion Livery Co., IO Ariz.
23, 85 Pac. 120 (19o6) (mortgage on "all the property now used and hereafter being
used" interpreted as not intended to include after-acquired property but merely inserted
to grant permission to use the mortgaged property) ; Maxwell Lumber Co. v. Connelly,
34 N. M. 562, 287 Pac. 64 (193o) (cash interpreted to be excluded from operation of a
broad after-acquired property clause) ; Flanagan Bank v. Graham, 42 Ore. 403, 71 Pac.
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as third persons are concerned, the instrument should be sufficiently
informative to indicate clearly that the property in question is subject
to the lien of the after-acquired property clause.93 A broad clause
mentioning "all after-acquired property" will generally do this more
effectively than a minute description. The question then becomes one
of intention. Sometimes the problem will be difficult to solve, but in
a great number of instances the question will be an easy one. For ex-
ample, the private owner of a manufacturing plant mortgages the plant
and "all property hereafter acquired by the mortgagor"; subsequently
he acquires a new residence. Most courts would probably find little
difficulty in concluding that the lien of the mortgage does not embrace
the mortgagor's personal home. 4 But all property acquired by the
mortgagor relating to the manufacturing plant would be included.
The same problem can rarely arise in the case of a corporate mort-
gage, and here a broad after-acquired property clause should be con-
strued to cover all property subsequently acquired by the mortgagor at
least to the extent that the property is related to the type of business
carried on by the mortgagor at the time of the execution of the mort-
gage.
95
Having cleared the picture of doctrinaire debris such as estoppel
and accession, and having discussed the various limitations suggested,
we come now not to the promulgation of dogmatic rules, but to the
consideration of certain operative facts which seem, from a study of
the cases, to have had most to do with framing the decisions. Since by
137 (1903) (court interpreted conduct of mortgagor as indicating intention to subordi-
nate his lien to later lien); Murray v. Farmville & Powhatan R. R., ioi Va. 262, 43
S. E. 553 (1903) (railroad mortgage included grant of all after-acquired property "con-
nected with or issuing from or relating to said railroad", held, not to include subse-
quently acquired property not related to the railroad then mortgaged) ; see South Texas
Implement & Mach. Co. v. Anahuac Canal Co., 280 S. W. 521, 523 (Tex. Comm. App.
1926).
93. The description need be only sufficient to constitute a warning. Roe v. State,
82 Ala. 68 (1886) ; Eddy v. McCall, 71 Mich. 497, 39 N. W. 734 (1888). In Smith v.
McCoy-Kessinger Lumber Co., lo8 Ark. 162, 157 S. W. 735 (1913) a recorded mort-
gage of the mortgagor's "last sawing" of lumber was held invalid against creditors
because the description was insufficient to give notice of the property intended to be
charged. In Alberts v. Alberts, 53 S. D. 463, 221 N. W. 8o (1928) a mortgage of an
automobile to be acquired was held inferior to the claim of a subsequent specific mort-
gagee because the incorrect automobile number was inserted in the recorded mortgage.
94. See Rose v. Lurton Co., iii Fla. 424, 149 So. 557 (1933), where a partnership
mortgaged the property of the business and included any property "which may be here-
after acquired by the parties of the first part and each of them." One partner subse-
quently acquired individual property. Held, the latter property was not included within
the partnership mortgage. In Ferguson v. Wilson, 122 Mich. 97, go N. W. ioo6 (1899)
a farmer executed a mortage of his farm, the implements, and machinery used in and
about the farm and "all other personal property which I may own or acquire." He sub-
sequently acquired personal property unrelated to the farm. Held, the latter could not
be included within the lien of the mortgage.
95. See cases cited supra note 9I; cf. Mississippi Valley Co. v. Chicago, St. L. &
N. 0. P. R., 58 Miss. 896 (i88i) ; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Sturtevant Co., 86 Miss.
509, 38 So. 783 (905).
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far the outstanding determinative force has been that of the type of
property involved, we have partitioned our discussion in that fashion.
Land
An attempt to mortgage land to be acquired in the future should
always be upheld, and the mortgage, when recorded, should grant the
mortgagee priority over all creditors, subsequent purchasers and lienors.
The great weight of authority favors this view.96 Permitting this does
not reduce a man to peonage, for the increment to the land is still his.
Creditors and prospective purchasers are protected, for a search of the
record will reveal the charge and give fair warning.
Personalty Utilized in Business
Machinery, equipment, and other fixed apparatus should receive
the same treatment as land. Comments under that heading are appli-
cable here.
Assuming that chattel mortgages may be created, after-acquired
personal property mortgages should be permitted in the absence of a
strong prohibitive public policy. None is present with respect to this
type of material. Furniture in hotels and inns constitutes capital goods
and often can be acquired only with funds advanced and secured by
a lien on the furniture to be acquired. No attempt will here be made
to itemize all property that should come within the operation of an
after-acquired property clause. Suffice it to say that all capital goods
used in business and industrial enterprises should come within a future
property mortgage. The bulk of case authority supports this con-
tention.97
96. Lang v. Choctaw, 0. & G. R. R., 198 Fed. 38 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912), cert. denied,
227 U. S. 68o (1913) ; Martin v. Bankers' Trust Co., 18 Ariz. 55, 156 Pac. 87 (1916) ;
Lamar Land & Canal Co. v. Belknap Say. Bank, 28 Colo. 344, 64 Pac. 21o (19O) ;
Hamlin v. European & N. A. Ry., 72 Me. 83 (1881) ; Pere Marquette R. R. v. Graham,
136 Mich. 444, 99 N. W. 408 (19o4); Howard v. Iron & Land Co., 62 Minn. 298, 64
N. W. 896 (895) (creditors, however, not involved as court treated the case) ; Blum
v. Planters' Bank & Trust Co., 161 Miss. 226, 135 So. 353 (1931) (contract to create
a mortage on land, though unrecorded, held superior to creditors obtaining statutory
liens upon death of mortgagor); Omaha & St. L. Ry. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry., io8
Mo. 298, 18 S. W. iOI (1892); Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Salem Light, Heat &
Power Co., 77 N. H. 146, 89 Atl. 452 (1914) (no secured creditors involved) ; Ehret
v. Price, 122 Okla. 277, 254 Pac. 748 (927). Contra: Maher v. Smead Heating &
Ventilating Co., ii Ohio C. C. 381 (1896) (mortgage of land to be acquired held in-
ferior to subsequent mortgage) ; see 27 OHio Jurxs. 267 (1933) ; Massachusetts Gaso-
line & Oil Co. v. Go-Gas Co., 259 Mass. 585, 593, 156 N. E. 871, 874 (1927) ("In this
Commonwealth a mortgage of real or personal property to be acquired does not attach
to that property, at law or in equity, as it comes into the hands of the mortgagor.").
97. Steams Lighting & Power Co. v. Central Trust Co., 223 Fed. 962 (C. C. A.
6th, 1915) (case involved electric transmission lines and court applied Michigan law;
on its facts case may well be one of accession) ; Mason v. Citizens' Nat. Trust & Say.
Bank, 71 F. (2d) 246 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934), 23 CALIF. L. REV. 628 (1935) ; Washington
Trust Co. v. Dunaway, 3 Alaska Fed. 301, 169 Fed. 37 (C. C. A. 9th, i9o9) (judgment
creditor sought to levy on locomotives and cars of railroad; injunction obtained by
mortgagee under recorded future property mortgage) ; Indian Creek Coal Min. Co. v.
Home Say. & Merchants Bank, 8o Colo. 96, 249 Pac. 499 (1926) (machinery); Marion
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Crops
Agricultural financing presents the conflict of interests in its most
acute form. Although farmers must be able to mortgage crops to be
grown in order to obtain funds with which to buy seed, etc., neverthe-
less legal sanction cannot be given to a device that will cause even more
farmers to become sharecroppers. The legislatures 98 and courts 99
Mortgage Co. v. Teate, 98 Fla. 713, I24 So. 172 (1929) (furniture in a hotel); Dover
Lumber Co. v. Case, 31 Idaho 276, 17o Pac. io8 (1918) (logging camp outfit) ; Poage
v. Co-operative Pub. Co., 57 Idaho 561, 66 P. (2d) 1119 (I937) (office furniture) ;
Westinghouse Electric Mfg. Co. v. Citizens' St. Ry., 24 Ky. L. Rep. 334, 68 S. W. 463
(i9o2) (electrification system; possibly a case of accession) ; Brady v. Johnson, 75
Md. 445, 26 At. 49 (1892) (works of canal company) ; Ludlum v. Rothchild, 41 Minn.
218, 43 N. W. 137 (1889) (furniture and fixtures in a saloon) ; Wright v. Bircher's
Ex'r, 72 Mo. i79 (i88o) (hotel furniture); Pierce v. Emery, 32 N. H. 484 (1856)
(cargo of iron) ; Smithurst v. Edmunds, 14 N. J. Eq. 4o8 (1862) (hotel furniture) ;
Monmouth County Electric Co. v. Central R. R., 54 Atl. i4o (N. J. Ch. i9o3) (poles
and electric transmission lines) ; McClung, Buffat & Buckwell v. Quincy Carriage &
Wagon Co., 117 Tenn. 250, 96 S. W. 96o (i9o6) (machinery and tools). Contra:
Griffith v. Douglass, 73 Me. 532 (882) (furniture to be placed in an inn) ; New Lin-
coln Hotel v. Shears, 57 Neb. 478, 78 N. W. 25 (1899) (hotel furniture) ; see Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. v. Commercial Bank, II Wis. 207, 209-10 (i86o) (dictum that rail-
road chairs could not be included in railroad future-property mortgage; holding based
on terms of the mortgage).
Much of the type of property enumerated in this section will occasionally become
subject to a general mortgage by virtue of the doctrine of accession to mortgaged prop-
erty. See supra p. 644. However, there is no certainty. For example, despite the
broad rule of accession adopted by the Pennsylvania courts (see cases cited supra note
6i), it will not include furniture placed in an apartment hotel. Klaus v. Majestic Apart-
ment House Co., 25o Pa. i94, 95 Ati. 451 (915).
98. E. g., see ALA. CODE AiN. (Michie, Supp. 1936) § 9oo8 (mortgages on crops
to be planted limited to those grown within period of one year, otherwise mortgage
void) ; ARx. DIG. STATS. (Pope, 1937) § 9446 (similar one year limitation) ; N. D.
Laws 1933, c. 150 (abolishes crop mortgages except those executed in favor of the
Federal Government). See Note (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 98.
99. In Alabama the courts ruled that a mortgage of crops to be grown would not
be effective unless the mortgagor had some interest in the land on which the crops were
to be grown, Moring v. Helms, 21o Ala. 175, 97 So. 647 (1923), 37 HARv. L. Ray. 765
(1924) (invalid as between the parties) ; Windham & Co. v. Stephenson & Alexander,
x56 Ala. 341, 47 So. 280 (i9o8); Vinson Bros. v. Finlay, 206 Ala. 478, 90 So. 310
(1921) ; Alexander v. Garland, 209 Ala. 267, 96 So. 138 (1923). The earlier case of
Hurst & McWhorter v. Bell & Co., 72 Ala. 336 (1882), seems clearly to have been
overruled.
In Colorado a mortgage of crops to be grown in the future is valid between the
parties but despite recording is ineffective as against third persons. First Nat. Bank of
Montrose v. Felter, 65 Colo. 370, 176 Pac. 496 (1918) ; Tolland Co. v. First State Bank
of Keenesburg, 95 Colo. 321, 35 P. (2d) 867 (1934). However, this is not the law of
Colorado with respect to property other than crops. Lamar Land & Canal Co. v. Bel-
knap Say. Bank, 28 Colo. 344, 64 Pac. 210 (1901) (land); Indian Creek Coal Min. Co.
v. Home Say. & Merchants Bank, 8o Colo. 96, 249 Pac. 499 (1926) (machinery, re-
corded mortgage held superior to execution creditors). See Note (1935) 7 RocicY
MT. L. REv. 264, 270-1.
The probability is that mortgages of cattle to be acquired by farms and ranches
are in the same position as crop mortgages. This would explain the holding in Steckel
v. Swift & Co., 56 S. W. (2d) 8o6 (Mo. App. 1933), that a recorded mortgage on cattle
to be acquired was ineffective against a purchaser, although the law of Missouri up to
this time was clear that after-acquired property could be mortgaged and that the mort-
gage, when recorded, was effective as against third, persons. Page & Bacon v. Gardner,
20 Mo. 507 (1855) (debts under a general deed of trust executed by newspaper owner;
law of after-acquired property clause applied) ; Wright v. Bircher's Ex'r, 72 Mo. 179
(188o) (after-acquired furniture in a hotel); Omaha & St. L. Ry. v. Wabash, St. L.
& P. Ry., io8 M4o. 298, I8 S. W. 11O1 (1892) (after-acquired hotel) ; see Langford v.
Fanning, 7 S. W. (2d) 726, 728 (Mo. App. 1928).
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conversant with the problem have imposed limitations upon farmers'
attempts to subject crops to the lien of an after-acquired property mort-
gage. These limitations may be justifiable and desirable. However,
the important point from the legal viewpoint is the understanding that
a decision with reference to crops does not create a rule applicable to
land or capital goods. More recently the courts have. begun to give
expression to this distinction. In a late Mississippi case 100 the court
held that a mortgage on crops to be grown in the three years following
the execution of the instrument was inferior, though recorded, to the
lien of a later mortgage of crops to be grown during the current year.
However, the court is careful to warn that "what we . . . say here
• . . must be understood as confining our decision strictly to annual
crops . . . And, moreover, we must be understood as dealing with
crops and with no other class of property." 101
If it were realized clearly that crop cases are not authority in situ-
ations involving other types of property, much of the present confusion
in the law of after-acquired property would disappear.' 02 The hybrid
New York rule that despite recording an after-acquired property clause
mortgagee is inferior to creditors but superior to purchasers would be
revised. That such a rule exists has been stated by eminent author-
ities; 103 but examination of the objectionable portion of the rule, i. e.,
that creditors prevail over the mortgagee reveals that that rule is based
upon the decision in a crop case. 10 4  The reasoning of the court in that
case was not limited to crops, but, as is true in many instances, the
court was groping toward a proper result and indulged in sophistry to
reach it. By discarding the reasoning and dealing with facts, holdings,
and underlying motivating forces, a more accurate picture will come
into focus.
Stock of Goods Held for Resale
What to do with mortgages executed by a merchant on a stock
of goods held for resale has been a vexatious problem to the courts.
The acute conflict of interests is accentuated by the desire to protect
creditors. When having nothing else to utilize for security, merchants
In Nebraska a mortgage of crops to be grown or animals to be acquired is invalid
against creditors. Cole v. Kerr, i9 Neb. 553, 26 N. W. 598 (1886) (crops) ; Battle
Creek Valley Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 62 Neb. 825, 88 N. W. 145 (i9o) (animals).
But the indication from Roebling's Sons Co. v. Nebraska Electric Co., io6 Neb. 255,
183 N. W. 546 (i92i) is that this rule will not be applied to after-acquired property of
manufacturing and service corporations. On its facts this case is an accession case, but
the language of the court is quite broad. Cf. Ginsberg, supra note 45. Contra: Steele
v. Ashenfelter, 40 Neb. 770, 59 N. W. 361 (1894).
ioo. Coffey v. Land, 176 Miss. 114, 167 So. 49 (1936).
iot. Id. at 116, 167 So. at 49.
io2. For example, compare discussion of Nebraska law in note 99 supra with Gins-
ber, supra note 45.
io3. Stone, supra note 23, at 519; WArsIT, MORTGAGES (1934) 57-63.
i04. Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, i42 N. Y. 570, 37 N. E. 632 (1894).
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can offer only a mortgage of their stock in trade. However, complete
power of sale must be granted to the mortgagor or there is a termina-
tion of the mercantile business. Courts sympathize with the struggle
to obtain credit and yet must be solicitous lest the individual find him-
self unable to conduct his business because of an unrestricted mortgage.
The courts must be mindful, too, that others may extend credit relying
upon the false appearance of prosperity engendered by a huge display
of merchandise. The legalistic answer to the latter problem is easy:
the mortgage will be recorded and therefore creditors will be warned.
Obviously, this ignores the practical situation. The credit problems
involved in the merchandising side of business are handled rapidly, and,
in addition, are continuing arrangements. Those furnishing merchan-
dise and stock should not be required to search the record prior to each
delivery; it would constitute an unwarranted expenditure of time and
money and would be a major obstacle to free flow in marketing. The
attempt satisfactorily to resolve this quandary exemplifies the adage
that hard cases make bad law. Briefly, and without purporting to de-
velop the various ramifications into which this enigma has led the courts,
in about half the states a mortgage of a stock of goods held for resale
with a power of sale vested in the mortgagor is invalid against creditors
of the mortgagor,105 while the other jurisdictions hold that it is merely
evidence of fraud but valid unless additional proof of intention to
defraud creditors is forthcoming.' 0 6 Within these rules can be found
a multitude of variations, apparently without rhyme or reason.'0 7
Most of these cases concern after-acquired property. It must be
borne in mind, however, that when a court subordinates the claim of a
mortgagee of a stock of goods to the claims of creditors it is not be-
cause after-acquired property is involved but simply because it is a
mortgage of a stock of goods held for resale with a power of sale in
the mortgagor. The fact that after-acquired property is involved
should not be an operative fact in these cases; it generally is not if one
goes beneath the veneer of the decisions to the true interests pro-
tected.' 08 Most of the decisions of the Massachusetts court could be
105. See 2 JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES (6th ed. 1933)
§ 415.
io6. Ibid.
1O7. E. g., see Kerr, Chattel Mortgages on Shifting Stocks of Goods in Washing-
to' (1936) 11 WASH. L. REV. i99; JONES, op. cit. supra note io5, § 397 (Missouri),
§ 401 (New York).
io8. E. g., in Arkansas a mortgage of future additions to a retail stock of goods
was held invalid against creditors. Farrow v. Farrow, 136 Ark. 14o, 2o6 S. W. 134
(1918). But a "retail stock of goods" mortgage is invalid as to creditors in Arkansas
even when no future additions are involved. Gauss Sons v. Doyle & Co., 46 Ark. 122
(1885); Coffman v. Citizens' Loan & Investment Co., 172 Ark. 889, 29o S. W. 961
(1927). A recorded future property mortgage not involving retail stock of goods is
valid against purchasers and creditors. Morton v. Williamson, 72 Ark. 390, 81 S. W.
235 (904) (purchaser) ; Little v. National Bank, 97 Ark. 57, 133 S. W. 166 (igio)
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explained by an inquiry into the nature of the property involved.1 0 9
These decisions, accepted for the broad proposition that future prop-
erty cannot be presently mortgaged, have led to unfortunate results
both in Massachusetts 110 and elsewhere. 1 They should be under-
stood for what they are-holdings that stock of goods cases involve
peculiar problems and therefore demand solutions distinct from the
answers given in the ordinary instances of the mortgaging of after-
acquired property.
Another series of cases, similar to the above but not identical, are
those in which a manufacturer or processor attempts to mortgage the
finished product and stock to be created in the future. The financing
problem is the same; the "peonage" fear is reduced; but the delusive
appearance to creditors is again present. There are, however, some
important differences. By and large the transactions involve larger
sums and therefore it is not unreasonable to require a more complete
credit-rating search,112 including examination of mortgage records.". 3
Also, creditors do not rely solely upon the stock as security but fre-
quently upon the plant, machinery, and equipment as well.
It is not surprising, then, to find a tendency on the part of the
courts to accord validity as against creditors and purchasers to a mort-
gage of a processor's or manufacturer's stock of goods." 4  Again, it
(creditors); Lang v. Choctaw, 0. & G. R. R., I98 Fed. 38 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912), cert.
denied, 227 U. S. 68o (i913). In Mississippi, a mortgage of future additions to a stock
of merchandise is invalid against creditors. Andrews v. Partee, 79 Miss. 8o, 29 So. 788
(igoi). If a stock of goods is not involved, the mortgage on chattels not in esse is
valid as to third persons. Everman & Co. v. Robb, 52 Miss. 653 (1876) (crops) ; Blum
v. Planters' Bank & Trust Co., I6i Miss. 226, 135 So. 353 (i931) (contract to create
mortgage on lands to be acquired). There are no cases involving capital goods in
Mississippi.
iog. E. g., the leading cases in Massachusetts are stock of goods cases. Jones v.
Richardson, io Metc. 481 (Mass. 1845); Moody v. Wright, 13 Metc. i7 (Mass. 1847)-
iio. The early Massachusetts decisions were followed in cases involving equipment
used in a printing establishment, Chesley v. Josselyn, 73 Mass. 489 (I856) ; property
of an electric light company, Harriman v. Woburn Electric Light Co., 163 Mass. 85, 39
N. E. 1004 (895); and property of a street railway, Federal Trust Co. v. Bristol
County St. Ry., 222 Mass. 35, io9 N. E. 88o (1915) (possibly not a holding but at least
a considered dictum).
In. See, e. g., Chynoweth v. Tenney, io Wis. 397 (i86o), following the Massa-
chusetts rule properly in a stock of goods case but accepting the broad language and
therefore later causing the judicial pronouncement that as against a subsequent mort-
gagee, a future-property railroad mortgage was invalid. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v.
Commercial Bank, II Wis. 207, 209-10 (i86o), aff'd, 15 Wis. 424 (1862). See also
Little v. National Bank, 97 Ark. 57, 61-2, 133 S. W. i66, 167 (igio); Farrow v. Far-
row, 136 Ark. 140, 148, 206 S. W. 134, 137 (iqi8).
12. See for differentiation in need for credit search in case of retailer and manu-
facturer, CREDIT MANAGEMENT (Am. Inst. Bank. 1931) 436-439. See for an example
of the case with which retailers obtain credit, Plummer & Ritter, Credit Extension and
Causes of Failure of Philadelphia Grocers, U. S. Dep't Comm., Trade Info. Bull. No.
700, 1930, p. 5.
113. See TREGoE, CREDIT AND ITS MANAGEMENT (1930) 134; TRUESDALE, CREDIT
BUREAU MANAGEMENT (927) 149-152.
114. Sieg v. Greene, 225 Fed. 955 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915) (contract to deliver bricks
to be manufactured construed to be a mortgage and held that mortgagee thereof is
superior to creditors) ; Morton v. Williamson, 72 Ark. 39o, 81 S. W. 235 (1904) (re-
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should be carefully noted that the basic controversy is over the nature
of the property without regard as to whether it is after-acquired or
not. The fact that it is after-acquired property should not be an ob-
stacle, if the fact that it is stock with a power of sale in the mort-
gagor is not.
Other Personal Property
When we leave the fields already discussed we enter virgin terri-
tory.xlD New precedents will have to be built up on a basis of the bal-
ance of interests with credit expansion, protection of the individual from
a status akin to serfdom, and the desire to relieve creditors and pur-
chasers from too great a burden of record inquiries all playing a part.
Statutes have been passed in some states apparently permitting un-
limited freedom in the mortgaging of future property." 6  Whether
courts will give them full effect or emasculate them to their own satis-
faction is another matter. The latter result should not be entirely
unexpected." 7
corded mortgage of lumber to be acquired by lumber mill held valid against purchaser);
Eddy v. McCall, 7i Mich. 497, 39 S. W. 734 (1888) (lumber to be processed; recorded
mortgage valid against execution creditor); Parker & Co. v. Jacobs, 14 S. C. 112
(188o) (after-acquired turpentine mortgaged by processor held valid against judgment
creditors); First Nat. Bank v. Turnbull & Co., 32 Gratt. 695 (Va. 188o) (after-
acquired cotton mortgage valid against execution creditors). Contra: Townsend Brick
& Contracting Co. v. Allen, 62 Kan. 311, 62 Pac. ioo8 (igoo) (recorded mortgage of
bricks to be manufactured held invalid against purchaser) ; Zartman v. First Nat. Bank,
189 N. Y. 267, 82 N. E. 127 (927) (recorded corporate mortgage to secure a bond
issue held invalid against creditors as to the after-acquired manufactured stock) ; Case
v. Fish, 58 Wis. 56, 15 N. W. 8o8 (1883).
115. There are several types of property that have been the subject of attempts to
mortgage in advance of acquisition but which have not been discussed here because the
problems in these cases are unrelated to the broad question dealt With in this article.
Notable examples are future income, rents, and profits. As to this see Israels and
Kramer, The Significance of the Income Clause in a Corporate Mortgage (1930) 30
COL. L. REV. 488. The mortgaging of future book accounts was considered in Benedict
v. Ratner, 268 U. S. 353 (1925), where the court held the mortgage invalid.
I16. The usual statute reads: "An agreement may be made to create a lien upon
property not yet acquired by the party agreeing to give the lien or not yet in existence.
In such case, the lien agreed for attaches from the time when the party agreeing to give
it acquires an interest in the thing to the extent of such interest." CAL. CrV. CODE
(Deering, 1937) §2883; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) §44-107; MONT. REv. CODE ANN.
(1935) § 8227; N. D. ComP. LAWS (1913) § 67o6; OKLA. STATS. ANN. (1937) tit. 42,
§ 8; 1 S. D. Coxp. LAWS (1929) § 1529.
117. In Montana where the above statute has been in existence for many years the
courts continue to make statements generally found only in the cases following the
Massachusetts rule. For example, the following dictum appears in Hackney v. Birely,
67 Mont. 155, 159, 215 Pac. 642, 644 (1923) : "This recording is equivalent to a delivery
of the property by the mortgagor to, and its retention by, the mortgagee. Whatever
delivery and retention of possession will enable the mortgagee to hold will be equally
held by the recorded mortgage, but what cannot be delivered and retained, except as to
property potentially in being in which the mortgagor has a personal interest, cannot
be placed of record as to what is to be mortgaged. The statute thus making the one
the equivalent of the other, the record is valid only to protect that which the statute
provides may be mortgaged." Obviously the statement is contradictory but the infer-
ence may be drawn that the court permits the statute to deal only with what can be
mortgaged as between the parties, but with regard to recordability the common-law
limitations prevail! This inference is strengthened by the fact that the quotation above
is a "lift" from a leading Maine case which held that a recorded after-acquired prop-
erty clause mortgage was invalid as to attaching creditors. Griffith v. Douglass, 73
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Conclusion and Caveat
The writers feel that by adopting the factual approach they have
probed beneath the sometimes plausible but more frequently sophistical
reasoning of the courts and revealed that the type of property involved
is the most important operative fact in the determination of whether
property to be acquired in the future may be presently mortgaged.
However, in some jurisdictions the chronic disregard of this type of
analysis by the courts and bar may make it a Sisyphean task to over-
turn general ideas as to the law of the state or to obtain the reversal
of precedents, which, under this analysis, are founded upon false
bases." s  On the whole, however, we believe that the analysis here
Me. 532, 535 (1882). There are no square holdings in Montana but the cases indicate
judicial reluctance to follow the statute. See also Security State Bank v. Mariette, 69
Mont. 536, 223 Pac. 114 (1924) ; Isbell v. Slette, 52 Mont. i56, I55 Pac. 503 (1916).
The situation is reminiscent of the Pennsylvania cases dealing with statutes per-
mitting the mortgaging of personal property. In an early and leading case the statute
involved permitted mortgaging by corporations of "their property". Pa. Laws 1867,
no. 1287, p. 1372. It was held that this meant "only such property as had been usually
mortgaged before the time of [the] passage" of the act. Roberts' Appeal, 6o Pa. 4oo,
402 (i869). A later statute, still in effect, provided that corporations may borrow
money and "secure the payment of the principal or interest, or both, of all or any part
of such indebtedness, by mortgage, deed of trust, or other pledge or conveyance, by way
of security, of all or any part of its real and personal property. .. " (Italics supplied.)
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1938) fit. I5, §24. The court held that the statute was
neither specific nor clear and therefore was to be interpreted as granting power to exe-
cute mortgages with respect to land and to allow for the recording of such mortgages
so as to bar third parties. With respect to personalty, however, the court held that such
mortgages would be valid as against third persons only if possession were given to the
mortgagee, recording having no effect at all. Klaus v. Majestic Apartment House Co.,
250 Pa. 194, 95 Atl. 451 (1915). It should thus be noted that the Pennsylvania rule
effectively prevents the use of a chattel mortgage insofar as priority over third persons
is concerned. The rule a fortiori applies to personalty to be acquired.
Real estate to be acquired can be validly mortgaged. Colonial Trust Co. v. Har-
mon Creek Coal Co., 287 Pa. 284, 135 Atl. 134 (1926). See Madden v. Borough of
Mt. Union, 322 Pa. lo9, 185 Atl. 275 (1936), 3 U. OF PITTSBURGH L. Rmv. i6o (prob-
lem of conflicting indentures containing after-acquired property clauses; the validity of
an after-acquired real estate mortgage was decided in limine). Today by statute there
may be chattel mortgages in Pennsylvania of leaseholds, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
1930) tit. 21, § 838; iron, iron products, boilers, engines, and miscellaneous personalty,
id. at § 86I ; vessels, id. at § 921 ; of any chattels, including after-acquired chattels, if
the mortgagee is the Federal Government, id. (Supp. 1938), tit. 21, § 841. Railroads
may mortgage "personal property", id. at tit. 67, § 523, but the mortgage is not valid
against third persons unless the property is conspicuously marked with the name of the
trustee. This statute does not authorize mortgages of shares of stock. Miners' Bank
of Wilkes-Barre v. Acker, 66 F. (2d) 85o (C. C. A. 3d, 1933).
i8. See In re Niagara Lead & Battery Co., 2o2 Fed. 2g98 (W. D. N. Y. 1913)
where the factual approach was urged upon the court and rejected. In Harriman v.
Woburn Electric Light Co., 163 Mass. 85, 39 N. E. 1OO4 (1895), the court ruled that
after-acquired personalty of an electric light and power company could not be mort-
gaged effectively as against creditors unless possession was taken. The court states
that this was conceded by counsel for the mortgagee. This was the first time the ques-
tion had arisen with respect to a corporate mortgage to secure a bond issue in the state.
Apparently it was accepted by both bench and bar that stock of goods cases, etc., were
authoritative here. See Olins, Mortgages on After-Acquired Property (1936) 7 LAW.
Soc. J. 227 (considering Massachusetts cases only). The writer not only accepts the
present rule enunciated by the Massachusetts courts but also seeks to show that as a
result of some cases the mortgage of future property in Massachusetts has no effect
even as between the parties. He bases this conclusion upon Leahy v. George, 273 Mass.
130, 173 N. E. 421 (1930). This case dealt with an unrecorded bill of sale for security
and had nothing to do with after-acquired property. He also cites Burach v. Peters,
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presented will prove a more accurate criterion by which to prognosticate
future results. Especially is this true for those advising the creditor
of the mortgagor, the proposed purchaser of property possibly within
the operation of the after-acquired property clause, and others who wish
to rely upon property free from lien. However, to the draftsmen of
the mortgage instruments and corporate trust indentures there must be
a word of caution. The Massachusetts courts have firmly adopted a
a policy antipathetical to the mortgaging of future personal property,
even though the mortgagor is a corporate entity. 19 The decisions of
the Massachusetts courts have had great weight in many fields of law
and the persuasive effect of its cases here too has been felt.120 Whether
a new approach is enough of a counterbalance remains to be seen.
Therefore, where the practice has been as it is in Massachusetts to
execute supplemental mortgages at periodic intervals,121 as the mort-
gagor acquires additional property, the safety system will have to con-
tinue until such time as there is more general acceptance of such an
obvious conclusion as that a dictum in a stock of goods case is not
imperative authority with respect to a case involving a power company
mortgage.
1 22
B. M. C. No. 319535 (1934). This is not a reported decision and apparently was de-
cided by the Boston Municipal Court, a nisi prius court. In any event, the decision of
such a court could hardly be taken as overruling a settled rule. Compare the more
realistic attitude taken in Note (1935) 7 RocKy MT. L. REV. 264.
119. Federal Trust Co. v. Bristol County St. Ry., 222 Mass. 35, iOg N. E. 88o
(1915) ; Harriman v. Woburn Electric Light Co., 163 Mass. 85, 39 N. E. OO4 (i895).
120. See supra note iii.
121. The writers have been informed by Massachusetts counsel that the corporate
practice is to take a supplemental mortgage each year to catch all property acquired
during the year. This is an expensive method of avoiding the effect of an unfortunate
rule of law.
122. In Harriman v. Woburn Electric Light Co., 163 Mass. 85, 39 N. E. 1oo4
(1895), the court accepted Blanchard v. Cooke, 144 Mass. 207, ii N. E. 83 (1887), as
controlling. In the latter case possession had been taken of an after-acquired stock of
goods and therefore the mortgagee was superior to creditors. Statements with regard
to invalidity not only related solely to stock of goods but also were mere dicta.
